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The positions and beliefs adopted by the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) on aspects of the Palestinian issue,
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, are of major in-
terest as they directed MB policies and enabled it to
mobilize opinion against Jordan’s foreign policy re-
garding Palestine. The framework of the Jordanian
Muslim Brotherhood’s views on Palestine was based
on the Islamization of the Palestinian question by the
prophetic claim that Jerusalem-Palestine is one ‘Is-
lamic land’ and by asserting the religious duty of Jor-
dan to play a strategic role in defending an Islamic
cause. Also, they believe that the conflict with Israel
is a religio-civilization conflict, not a political one,
between Islam and Judaism. 
The Jordanian
M u s l i m Brotherhood’s 
Perceptions of
t h e P a l e s t i n i a n
I s s ue1For the MB the Palestine problem is central.The liberation of all of Palestine (including
the land controlled by Israelis in 1948) is con-
sidered as both a religious and an Arab na-
tionalist duty, given the historic importance
of Jerusalem and Palestine as an ‘Islamic
land’. The MB was deeply concerned with
the Palestinian issue at an early stage and
shared the belief that Jordan had a special
role to play, based on its proximity to Israel
and its vulnerability to Israeli ambitions. The
MB also believed that the land of Jordan is, in
an eschatological sense, ‘the land of mobili-
zation and constancy’ (Ard al-Hashd wa al-
R i b a t ) for the whole Muslim world in its bat-
tle for the liberation of Palestine. This reli-
gious perspective is taken from the MB’s un-
derstanding of the meaning of a h a d i t h, in
which it was reported that the Prophet said
Muslims will fight and defeat the Jews one
day before the end of the world, and that the
place of Muslims will be on the east side of
the Jordan River, while the Jews will be on
the west side (i.e. the so-called East and West
Banks). Most h a d i t h compilations mention
that the Muslims will be victorious in the
fight against the Jews, but they do not indi-
cate the place of battle, excepting one fa-
mous h a d i t h transmitted by Nur al-Din ‘Ali
al-Haythami (d. AD 807) in his M a j m ac a l -
Zawa’id wa Manbac a l - F a w a ’ i d .2
The MB’s literature and interviews with its
leaders confirm that it continues to believe
in these prophecies. They have, in fact, be-
come a source of the MB’s philosophy and
ideology regarding the Palestinian issue. MB
leaders believe that the Muslims will liberate
the whole of Palestine and will gain a reli-
gious victory in their battle with the Jews, in
accordance with the Prophet’s promise. As it
was succinctly put by Yusef al -Azam, a lead-
ing MB figure and former minister of social
affairs: ‘The victory is inevitable but it needs
a long breath.’
The MB also believes that Israel was creat-
ed as a foreign ‘infection’ in the Islamic
world and that its expansion is motivated by
the ambition to divide the Arab and Islamic
world. The MB’s view of the Jews is based on
many Quranic verses and historical events.
The MB has described the Jews as ‘dishon-
est’, ‘defilers of the prophets’, ‘liars’, ‘God’s
adversaries’, and ‘corrupt’. The distinction
between Jews, Zionists, and Israelis is not
made clear by the MB, although it does
recognize Judaism and the Jews as a reli-
gious community, but essentially the MB be-
lieves that conflict with the Jews and Zion-
ism is a conflict between two opposing civil-
izations based on religion.
From the MB perspective, to give up Pales-
tinian, Arab, and Islamic rights in Palestine is
unacceptable as far as the Islamic Shari’ah
and faith are concerned. Not a single inch of
the land ‘blessed by Allah’, the first q i b l a h
(the Muslims’ prayer orientation) for Mus-
lims, nor the third most sacred shrine in Is-
lam can be given away. This land can never
be subjected to bargaining since it is a trust
whose preservation is the responsibility of
all Muslim generations until the Judgement
Day. Any concessions constitute an act of in-
justice to future generations and an arbitrary
measure that is rejected by the Islamic reli-
gion. The opinion of non-governmental
Muslim scholars and organizations has re-
mained unchanged in f a t w a s issued in 1937,
1947, 1956, 1968, and 1979. In a recent f a t w a
issued after the intifada began in December
1987, a group of Muslim scholars (including
MB leaders) stated the following:
‘By virtue of the covenant which Allah
put upon us in order to proclaim the
truth and explain it to the people, we
hereby declare that jihad is the sole
means to liberate Palestine, that it is not
permissible under any circumstance to
concede a single square inch of the Land
of Palestine to the Jews, and that no per-
son or organization has the right or the
authority to consent to the Jewish claims
in Palestine or concede any part of it to
the Jews or recognize their existence on
any part of its soil.’3
In the same statement they also called for Is-
lamization of the Palestinian issue. 
This view of the MB contrasts with that of
the Jordanian government, which recogniz-
es the Israeli state. The MB accepts the Jew-
ish minority, which was settled in Palestine
before 1918 (before the British colonized it),
as was expressed by Ibrahim Ghushah (for-
mer MB leader and the spokesman of Ha-
mas), but under Muslim majority rule. It fur-
ther accepts the establishment of a Palestin-
ian state in any part of liberated Palestinian
land, but only as a step toward full liberation.
The MB and the Palestinian
l e a d e r s h i p
Given this position of the MB, Palestinian
nationalist organizations were not consid-
ered important. In fact, as regards the MB’s
position and views vis-à-vis the PLO, in the
early and mid-1980s, the literature of the MB
generally did not view the PLO positively. At
the same time it did not declare directly that
the PLO was not the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinians. The MB differed
from the Jordanian government in that it
was more concerned with the PLO’s ideolo-
gy and policy than with the issue of the
PLO’s representation of the Palestinian peo-
ple, whether inside or outside Jordan. The
MB in Jordan was far more hostile to the PLO
than were other branches of the Internation-
al Muslim Brotherhood (IMB), particularly in
Egypt. In the early 1980s, the attitude of the
MB towards the PLO appears to have been
more flexible than in the late 1980s after the
appearance of Hamas. There was an inner
feeling or common belief among some lead-
ers of the MB that the PLO was ‘a Palestinian
Front which represents “part” of the Pales-
tinian people.’ In a personal interview, Ziad
Abu Ghanimah, a former spokesman of the
MB said, ‘We are the ones representing the
[Palestinian] issue, not others such as the Ar-
ab Governments or the PLO.’
MB and the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y
The MB’s position and views vis-à-vis t h e
Palestinian Authority (PA) came into exist-
ence following Oslo Accords (September
1993 ). To begin with, it should be clear that
the PA is almost a complete offshoot of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, which
was there before signing the aforemen-
tioned agreements. The MB has so far de-
clared no clear position regarding the recog-
nition of the PA as the sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. In
other words, the MB has adopted the same
view as Hamas; the PA, for them, is only one
part of the Palestinian people. Therefore,
they do not recognize the political legitima-
cy of the PA leadership of the Palestinian
people. This, however, does not mean that
the MB refuses to co-exist with the PA as a de
f a c t o leadership. On the other hand, the MB
takes Hamas as its Palestinian brother in Pal-
estine. It is not surprising that the two sides
share the same ideology and close policies.
The MB and Jordan’s relation
with the West Bank
With regard to Jordan’s relationship to the
West Bank, the MB expressed through its for-
mer spokesman in Parliament, Yusef al Azam,
the belief that ‘we are in the two Banks one
nation in blood and in family. We are one
people not two.’4 On this basis the MB tend-
ed to support the annexation of the West
Bank to Jordan after its liberation from the Is-
raeli occupation. It seemed that this support
was based on the MB’s principle of calling for
Islamic world unity, more than on its political
support for the Jordanian government’s poli-
cy towards the West Bank. The MB therefore
rejected the government’s decision to disen-
gage from the West Bank in July 1988.
The MB and the peace
i n i t i a t i v e s
The MB believed that all present peaceful
initiatives and agreements – be they Ameri-
can, Israeli, Arab, or Palestinian – should be
rejected because they surrender part of Pal-
estine. As for the stand of the MB concerning
the Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty (Oslo,
1993) and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty
of 1994, the movement declared, through its
political and official statements and through
its deputies at the Jordanian Parliament, its
rejection of the above-mentioned treaties. In
fact, it had launched a number of peaceful
demonstrations as a means of protest. Fur-
thermore, the MB demanded that the Jorda-
nian-Israeli peace treaty be frozen as one of
its conditions to end its boycott of the 1997
Parliament elections.
It rejected all UN resolutions, in particular
Resolution(s) 181, 242, and 338, because
they were deemed inconsistent with stand-
ards of Islamic justice. The MB further assert-
ed that negotiation or conciliation with the
Zionist enemy, ‘the usurper of Muslim land’,
in a way which leads to the surrender of
Muslims’ rights and land, were opposed by
Islamic law.
The practical means of asserting Palestini-
an Islamic rights was j i h a d. The MB believed
that this was the sole means of liberating
Palestine from the Zionists and those who
are behind them. The starting points for j i-
h a d are the Muslim peoples, supporters of
the Palestinian Muslim people, and the Is-
lamic lands, in particular the lands of the
front-line states.5
Abdullah al-Akailah, former deputy leader
of the Islamic Action Party and MP, pointed
o u t :
‘If we do not own the means of jihad or
defence now, we demand of the Jordan-
ian and other Islamic governments and
people to prepare themselves. We do
not want to compel our government to
become involved in a military confronta-
tion with a powerful enemy in this stage
of weakness. Power is not everlasting
and weakness is not to continue for
e v e r . ’
The MB and the Palestinian-
Jordanians 
With regard to the Jordanians of Palestin-
ian origin, the MB expresses supreme loyal-
ty to Islamic precepts, and priority is given
to the promoting of an Islamic identity. As
a result of this, it refuses to admit any dis-
tinction between a Jordanian and Palestin-
ian identity. Both peoples, it insists, must
have equal rights in citizenship and in Pal-
estinian and Jordanian affairs, regardless of
their citizenship or origin. This does not
‘The political involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in
Jordan goes back to the establishment of the state. It was estab-
lished upon Jordanian Independence in 1946 with King Abdul-
lah’s approval. It formed many offices and branches in Palestin-
ian cities such as Jerusalem and in the West and East Banks. It
participated in the 1948 war against the Jews in Palestine, under
the first MB leader, Abd al-Latif Abu Qaurah. The MB joined with
other members of the IMB (International Muslim Brotherhood) in
mobilizing Arabs to participate in the war. They trained fighters,
collected money, bought weapons, cooperated with the other
popular Arab organizations and with the Arab League, and exert-
ed popular political pressure on the government to become
more effective in the struggle.’
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mean that the MB accepts the Israeli idea
of the ‘Jordanian option’ for the Palestini-
ans. It totally rejects it. Through Islamizing
the Palestinian issue, the distinction be-
tween Palestinians and Jordanians, and
that between Palestine and Jordan are dis-
solved. 
Summarizing these issues in a personal in-
terview, Dr Isaac Farhan, one of the leading
figures of the MB and the former Secretary-
General of the Islamic Action Front Party,
starkly expressed the contrasting view of the
MB of Palestine:
‘We consider the Palestinian issue a
basic and key issue for three reasons.
First, on the ideological side, the defence
of Palestine is defence of the Islamic ide-
ology. Second, on the national side
(umma), the Israeli existence inside the
nation’s body divides and destroys the
nation. Third, as homeland ( w a t a n ) ,
Palestine is an Arab and Islamic land and
the homeland must not be surrendered.’
The MB’s perceptions of the Palestinian is-
sue were based on an ideology deriving
from purely religious views, but as Jamil Abu
Bakir, MB spokesman, in a personal interview
pointed out, although the Palestinian issue
was a ‘holy cause’, the MB wanted to avoid
conflict with the Jordanian government,
even though it opposed the peace process
and possible consequences such as econom-
ic and cultural cooperation between Jordan
and Israel. 
It can be said that the MB, despite its ideo-
logical view, has always avoided collision
with the government, even with all the ‘U-
turns’ the government has chosen, in so far
as the Palestinian issue is concerned. This
clearly indicates the pragmatic nature of the
movement’s political behaviour, as well as
its ability to strike a balance between its ide-
ological stands on the one side and all varia-
bles on the regional and Jordanian political
arena on the other. ♦
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1992. 
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